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Few%cases%qualify%for%constitutional6blockbuster%status.%Evans,%however,%is%one%of%them.1%At%its%heart%
lie% questions% about% a% network% of% constitutional% relationships% between% the% monarchy% and% the%
executive,%constitutional%convention%and%constitutional% law,% the%executive%and%the%courts,% ‘regular’%
courts%and%tribunals%and,%ultimately,%between%several%fundamental%constitutional%principles.%It%is%the%
range%and%depth%of%those%questions,%together%with%the%disparate%answers%given%to%them%by%a%divided%
seven6Justice%Supreme%Court,% that% justifies%characterising%Evans% as%one%of% the% landmark%public6law%
cases%of%the%early%21st%century.%%%%
The%facts%are%eye6catching%to%say%the% least.2%For%several%decades,% it%has%been%the%practice%of%Prince%
Charles%to%send% letters%to%Government%Ministers%sharing%his%views%on%matters%of%public%policy.%The%
attempts%of%journalist%Rob%Evans%to%leverage%the%Freedom%of%Information%Act%2000%(FoIA)%in%order%to%
secure%the%release%of%these%‘black6spider%memos’%—%so%called%because%of%Charles’s%handwriting%style%
and%preferred%ink%colour3%—%triggered%a%decade6long%legal%saga%that%culminated%in%the%judgment%of%
the% Supreme% Court% in% Evans.% After% the% relevant% Departments% declined% —% citing% public6interest%
grounds%—%to%release%the%memos,%Evans%complained%to%the%Information%Commissioner,%who%upheld%
the% Departments’% decisions.% However,% in% a% subsequent,% path6breaking% judgment,% the%
Commissioner’s% decisions% were% overturned% on% appeal% by% the% Upper% Tribunal.% Following% detailed%
consideration% of% constitutional% conventions% pertaining% to% the% role% of% the% heir% to% the% throne,4%the%
Tribunal%held%that%the%public%interest%in%revealing%the%nature%and%extent%(if%any)%of%Charles’s%influence%
on% Government% outweighed% any% public% interest% that% might% be% served% by% facilitating% Charles’s%
lobbying%of%Ministers%behind%a%veil%of%secrecy.5%%
That%was%not,%however,%the%end%of%the%matter,%since%the%Government%then%resorted%to%its%executive6
override%power%under%section%53%of%the%FoIA.%By%issuing%a%certificate%asserting%‘reasonable%grounds’%
for% the% opinion% that% non6disclosure%would% not% be% unlawful,% the%Government% sought% to% nullify% the%
Upper% Tribunal’s% order% that% the% letters% be% disclosed.% In% advancing% such% ‘reasonable% grounds’,% the%
Attorney6General%contended%that%disclosure%might%undermine%Charles’s%perceived%political%neutrality%
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1%R'(Evans)'v'Attorney0General%[2015]%UKSC%21,%[2015]%2%WLR%813.%%
2%This%article% is%concerned%with%only%the%domestic6law%point%that%fell% for%determination% in%Evans.% It%does%
not% address% a% separate% ground,% concerning% EU% law,% on% which% the% Attorney6General% (unsuccessfully)%
appealed%to%the%Supreme%Court.%%
3%Although% it% turns% out% that% the% letters% that% were% the% subject% of% the% freedom6of6information% requests%
were%in%fact%typewritten.%%
4%This% aspect% of% the% Evans' saga% is% itself% highly% constitutionally% significant.% For% discussion,% see% Philip%
Murray,%‘The%Prince%and%the%Paper:%Disclosing%Prince%Charles's%Advocacy%Correspondence’%[2013]%CLJ%1.%%
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and%%thereby%undermine%public%confidence%in%his%capacity%to%serve%as%king.%(It%worth%pausing%to%note%
that%that%claim%looks%—%at%best%—%overblown%now%that%the%letters%have%seen%the%light%of%day.)6%The%
Attorney6General% went% on% to% argue% that% engaging% in% this% form% of% advocacy% formed% an% aspect% of%
Charles’s% preparation% for% kingship% such% that% the% letters% fell% within% the% scope% of% the% so6called%
education%convention.%Thereafter,%the%Government’s%use%of%the%veto%was%itself%challenged%by%way%of%
judicial%review%—%unsuccessfully%in%the%Administrative%Court,7%but%successfully%in%the%Court%of%Appeal8%
and%in%the%Supreme%Court.9%It%is%the%judgment%of%the%latter%Court%that%forms%the%focus%of%this%article.%%
Relational"constitutional"principles""
The% question% with% which% Evans' is% centrally% concerned% is% the% extent% to% which% it% is% legally% and%
constitutionally% legitimate% for% a' court' exercising' powers' of' judicial' review% to% strike% down% a%
Government'Minister’s%decision%made%under%powers%granted%by%Parliament% in%order%to%overturn%an%
independent'judicial'tribunal’s%judgment.%The%case%thus%features%four%institutional%actors%drawn%from%
across% the% three% branches% of% government.% And%while% Evans' is% ostensibly% about% the% extent% of% the%
relevant%actors’%respective%powers,% it% is%more%fundamentally%about%the%meaning%and% interaction%of%
the% three% fundamental% principles% —% the% rule% of% law,% the% sovereignty% of% Parliament% and% the%
separation%of%powers%—%that% shape%both% the%constitutional%authority%of% those% institutions%and% the%
relationships%that%exist%between%them.%%
Inevitably,%such%questions%do%not%admit%of%straightforward%answers:%they%form%sites%of%controversy,%
how%they%fall%to%be%approached%being%coloured%heavily%by%the%underlying%constitutional%perspective%
that% one% adopts.% Parliamentary% sovereignty,% for% instance,% would% appear% to% preclude% judicial%
evisceration%of%administrative%authority%—%including%even%a%discretionary%power%to%override%a%judicial%
decision%—%conferred%via%primary%legislation.%But%it%does%not%necessarily%follow%that%the%sovereignty%
of%Parliament%requires%a%reviewing%court%to%conceive%of%such%discretion%in%uncontrolled%or%generous%
terms:%the%extent%of%legislatively%confided%executive%power%is%a%product%not%merely%of%the%statutory%
text,% but% of% the% way% in% which% other% constitutional% principles% operate% upon% it% and% influence% its%
construction.% For% example,% the% rule% of% law% jealously% guards% the% judicial% role% as% arbiter% of% legal%
disputes% and% therefore% inevitably% views%with% suspicion% the%notion%of% executive%override%of% judicial%
authority.%Yet%the%rule%of%law%arguably%also%views%with%suspicion%judicial%intransigence%in%the%face%of%
clear%legal%provisions%enshrined%in%an%Act%of%Parliament.%It%is%simplistic,%therefore,%to%suppose%that%the%
rule% of% law% speaks% only% with% one% voice% when% confronted% with% a% statutory% provision% facilitating%
ministerial%override%of%a%judicial%tribunal.%A%similar%point%can%be%made%in%respect%of%the%separation%of%
powers.%That%doctrine%naturally%places%in%doubt%the%legitimacy%of%what%might%be%characterised%as%an%
administrative%incursion%into%judicial%territory%through%the%exercise%of%an%executive6override%power.%
But% if% that% power% has% been% conferred% in% the% first% place% by% legislation% enacted% by% Parliament,% the%
separation%of%powers%may%be%understood%to%require%a%degree%of%respect%for%Parliament’s%legislative%
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6%Prince%Charles’s% letters% to%Government%Ministers,% together%with%Ministers’% responses,% are%available%at%
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entitlement% to% allocate% authority% that% arises% pursuant% to% one% of% its% statutory% schemes,% and% a%
commensurate%degree%of%respect%for%executive%judgements%rendered%under%such%schemes.%%
Each%of% the%constitutional%principles% in%play% in%Evans' is% thus%multifaceted%and%complex.%At% least% to%
some% extent,% the%meaning% and% content% that%we% assign% to% one% of% those% principles% is% necessarily% a%
function%of%the%meaning%and%content%that%we%ascribe%to%one%or%both%of%the%other%principles.%It%is,%for%
instance,%problematic%to%suggest%that%parliamentary%sovereignty%requires%this%or%that%meaning%to%be%
assigned%to%a%given% legislative%provision:%the%assignment%of%meaning%can%only%be%the%product%of%an%
interpretive% process,% which% will% itself% be% informed% by% (among% other% things)% other% relevant%
constitutional%principles.%In%this%sense,%the%basic%architecture%of%the%constitution%consists%of%a%series%
of% relational% principles.% They% make% subtle,% overlapping,% sometimes6contradictory,% sometimes6
complementary%claims.%None%of%them%stands%for%a%simple%proposition,%and%the%degree%of%complexity%
that% they% exhibit% when% viewed% in% isolation% is% multiplied% when% they% are% —% as% they% must% be% —%
conceived% of% in% relational% terms.% For% this% reason,% a% large% part% of% the% complexity% of% constitutional%
adjudication% in% cases% such% as% Evans% derives% from% the% need% to% determine% not% simply% what% these%
fundamental%principles%mean,%but%how%they%interact%with,%qualify%and%inform%prevailing%conceptions%
of%one%another.%Unsurprisingly,%there%is%considerable%scope%for%differences%of%view%in%relation%to%such%
matters,% as% Evans' amply% attests.% Those% differences% are%manifested% not% only% by% the% very% different%
positions% adopted% by% the% majority% and% minority% judges,% but% by% highly% significant% differences% of%
emphasis% within% the% majority.% The% remainder% of% this% article% is% structured% by% reference% to% the%
distinction%between%the%two%majority%judgments%(given%respectively%by%Lord%Neuberger,%with%whom%
Lords%Kerr%and%Reed%agreed,%and%Lord%Mance,%with%whom%Lady%Hale%agreed).%However,%account%will%
also%be%taken%of%taken%of%the%positions%adopted%by%the%dissentients,%Lords%Hughes%and%Wilson,%not%
least% because% their% disagreement% with% Lords% Neuberger% and% Mance% is,% to% an% extent,% simply% an%
exaggerated%version%of%the%disagreement%that%exists%between'Lords%Neuberger%and%Mance.%%
A"bottom5up,"administrative5law"approach"
The%two%majority%judgments%are%distinguished%by%the%legal%lenses%through%which%they%approach%the%
issues.% Lord%Neuberger’s% approach% (of%which%more% later)% relies%heavily% upon% the% capacity%of% other%
constitutional0law%principles%to%operate%radically%upon%the%interpretive%process,%thereby%shaving%the%
hard%edges%off%the%notion%of%parliamentary%sovereignty.%Lord%Mance,%in%contrast,%whilst%alive%to%the%
rule6of6law%and%separation6of6powers%issues%at%stake,%seeks%to%refract%them%more%subtly,%through%an%
administrative0law%lens.%%
In% approaching% the% central% question%—%whether% the% Attorney6General% had% established% that% there%
were% ‘reasonable% grounds’% for%non6disclosure—%Lord%Mance% therefore%paid%particular% attention% to%
the%standard%of%review%that%should%apply%when%assessing%the%adequacy%of%the%proffered%grounds.%It%
might%be%thought%obvious%that%that%standard%should%be%reasonableness,%both%because%it%represents%
the%default%setting%in%administrative%law,%and%because%the%reference%to%‘reasonable’%grounds%in%the%
statute%appears%to%imply%that%judicial%scrutiny%should%be%confined%to%an%inquiry%as%to%reasonableness.%
However,%neither%of%these%considerations%need%be%—%or,%for%Lord%Mance,%was%—%determinative.%As%to%
the% first%point,% the%default% status%of%Wednesbury' review10%is% increasingly%questionable.11%%As% to% the%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
10%Associated'Provincial'Picture'Houses'Ltd'v'Wednesbury'Corporation%[1948]%1%KB%223.""
11%For% instance,% the% Supreme% Court% indicated% in% Pham' v' Secretary' of' State' for' the' Home' Department'
[2015]%UKSC%19,% [2015]% 1%WLR%1591% that% a% proportionality% standard%may%be% appropriate% and% available%
beyond% the% traditional%provinces%of% EU% law%and%Convention%and% common6law% rights% cases.% Indeed,% the%
second%matter,% it%does%not% follow%that% the%word% ‘reasonable’% in% the% legislation%necessarily% licences%
the%Attorney6General%to% invoke%the%override%power%provided%only%that%to%do%so% is%not%Wednesbury'
unreasonable.%The%meaning%of% the% term% ‘reasonable%grounds’%necessarily%depends%on%a%process%of%
statutory%construction%to%which%relevant%constitutional%principles%are%pertinent.%What%passes%muster%
as%reasonable%grounds%for%(say)%declining%to%grant%a%licence%and%for%overriding%a%judicial%decision%are%
two%very%different%kettles%of%fish,%and%no%constitutional%heterodoxy%is%involved%in%suggesting%that%the%
latter%form%of%executive%action%warrants%closer%scrutiny.%The%catholic%notion%of%reasonableness%that%is%
yielded%by%this%analysis%has%its%roots%in%the%anxious6scrutiny%model%embraced%by%the%courts%in%human6
rights%cases%prior%to%the%enactment%of%the%Human%Rights%Act%1998.12%%
It%was% against% this% background% that% Lord%Mance% considered% the%meaning% of% the% term% ‘reasonable%
grounds’,%and%so%the%operative%standard%of%review.%Endorsing%(at% least% implicitly)%certain%aspects%of%
Lord%Neuberger’s%view,%Lord%Mance%said% that% there% is%an% incongruity%—%which% is% ‘if% anything%more%
marked%in%the%case%of%a%court%of%record%like%the%Upper%Tribunal’%—%entailed%by%‘a%minister%or%officer%
of%the%executive,%however%distinguished,%overriding%a%judicial%decision’.13%Such%incongruity%arises,%as%
noted% above,% because% of% the%prima' facie' tension% between% executive% override% of% judicial% decisions%
and%key%aspects%of%the%rule6of6law%and%separation6of6powers%principles.%This%led%Lord%Mance%to%the%
conclusion% that% the% reasonable6grounds% criterion% in% the% statute% was% more% demanding% that% the%
standard% public6law% requirement% of%Wednesbury% reasonableness.% The% statute,% he% said,% erected% ‘a%
higher% hurdle% than% mere% rationality’.14 %In% this% way,% Lord% Mance% permitted% the% fundamental%
constitutional% principles%with%which% the% statutory% scheme,% at% least% taken% at% face% value,% lacked% full%
congruity%to%shape%the%construction%of%that%scheme,%thus%facilitating%the%adoption%of%a%more%exacting%
conception%of%reasonableness.%%
Although% Lord% Mance’s% bottom% line% was% that% something% more% than% conventional% rationality% is%
required,% further% nuance%was% added% to%his% analysis% by% the%distinction%he%drew%between%executive%
override%on%the%basis%of%disagreement%with%the%Tribunal%concerning%(a)%findings%of%fact%or%law%and%(b)%
the% ascription%of%weight% to% and% the% subsequent%weighing% of% competing% public% interests.% As% to% the%
former,%he%concluded%that%the%executive%would%be%capable%of%establishing%reasonable%grounds%only%
by%supplying%‘the%clearest%possible%justification’%—%a%hurdle%he%considered%to%be%so%high%as%potentially%
to%remove%any%practical%difference%between%his%preferred%approach%and%Lord%Neuberger’s%ostensibly%
more% drastic% reading% of% the% statute.15%As% to% the% latter,% however,% Lord%Mance% considered% that% the%
weighing% of% competing% interests% was% ‘contemplated’% by% the% Act% and% would% pass% muster% on% the%
reasonable6grounds%test%if%‘properly%explained’%and%accompanied%by%‘solid%reasons’.16%%
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courts% have% already% departed% from% conventional% Wednesbury' review' in% cases% concerning% executive%
override%of% institutionally%expert%non0judicial%decision6makers:%see,%e.g.,%R'(Bradley)'v'Secretary'of'State'
for'Work'and'Pensions%[2008]%EWCA%Civ%36,%[2009]%QB%114."
12%E.g.%R'v'Ministry'of'Defence,'ex'parte'Smith%[1996]%QB%517.%See%further%Sir%John%Laws,%‘Wednesbury’%in%
Christopher%Forsyth%and% Ivan%Hare% (eds),%The'Golden'Metwand'and' the'Crooked'Cord' (Clarendon%Press%
1998).%%
13%[2015]%UKSC%21,%[2015]%2%WLR%813,%[123]%(Lord%Mance).%%
14%[2015]%UKSC%21,%[2015]%2%WLR%813,%[128].%
15%[2015]%UKSC%21,%[2015]%2%WLR%813,%[130].%
16%[2015]%UKSC%21,%[2015]%2%WLR%813,%[130].%
This% distinction% reflects% particular% understandings% of% the% respective% roles% of% the% judiciary% and% the%
executive%under%the%separation%of%powers,%reserving%greater%latitude%to%the%executive%in%relation%to%
matters% of% public% policy% upon% which% it% may% claim% special% authority.% In% this% way,% Lord% Mance’s%
approach% tracks% considerations% that% underpin% the% doctrine% of% curial% deference% that% shapes%
substantive% judicial% review,%albeit% that%such%considerations%play%out% in%Evans' in%an%usually%complex%
setting% that% involves% both% the% relative% competences% of% the% reviewing% court% and% the% executive%
defendant,%and%the%relative%competences%of%the%defendant%and%the%judicial%tribunal%which%made%the%
decision%which%is%the%subject6matter%of%the%relevant%disagreement.%For%instance,%Lord%Mance’s%view%
that%deference%should%not%be%exhibited%in%relation%to%disagreements%concerning%fact%or% law%springs%
not%primarily% from% the' reviewing' court’s% superior% expertise%or% constitutional% position,% but% from% its%
regard%for%the%Upper'Tribunal%as%an%expert,%independent%judicial%body%whose%views%on%such%matters%
ought%to%be%secured%against%ready%administrative%interference.%Indeed,%when%Lord%Mance%went%on%—%
having%concluded%that%the%disagreement%between%the%Attorney6General%and%the%Upper%Tribunal%did%
not% concern% the%weighing% of% public% interests%—% to% apply% the% clearest6possible6justification% test,% it%
proved% to% be% exceptionally% demanding.% Even% though% the% Attorney6General% supplied% substantial%
reasons% for% his% decision,% Lord% Mance% judged% them% insufficient% because% they% failed% to% disclose%
adequate% engagement% with,% or% ‘give% any% real% answer% to’,% % the% ‘closely% reasoned% analysis’% of% the%
Upper% Tribunal.17%Lord%Mance’s% approach% thus% set% the%bar% very%high% indeed,% enabling% the% court% to%
treat% as% inadequate% reasons% for% the% exercise% of% the% override% power% that% —% % although% arguably%
reasonable,%in%the%sense%of%being%substantial%and%not%obviously%illogical%—%were%not%considered%to%be%
sufficiently%convincing.%%
The% primary% point% of% contention% as% between% Lord% Mance% and% the% dissentients% was% an% issue% of%
characterization,% the%dissentients%concluding%that%the%disagreement%between%the%Attorney6General%
and% the%Upper%Tribunal%concerned%not%matters%of% fact%or% law%but% the%weighing%of%public% interests.%
However,%the%difference%between%Lord%Mance%and%the%dissentients%arguably%goes%deeper%than%this.%
Lord%Mance%agreed%with% Lord%Wilson% that% the%weighing%of%public% interests% is% a% function%which% the%
legislation%contemplates%will%be%performed%by%the%Government.%As%such,%Lord%Mance%accepted%that%a%
Ministerial%decision%about%the%weighing%of%such%interests%would%be%lawful% if% ‘properly%explained’%by%
reference% to% ‘solid% reasons’.18%However,% the%extent% to%which% Lords%Mance%and%Wilson%are% really% in%
agreement%on%this%point% is%questionable.%A%requirement%to%supply%reasons%that%are%‘solid’% implies%a%
qualitative% assessment% of% them% that% transcends% standard% rationality% review% which,% at% least% in% its%
orthodox%manifestation,%is%concerned%only%with%the%detection%of%decisions%that%are%so%unreasonable%
as%to%defy%logic%or%basic%tenets%of%morality.19%Certainly,%Lord%Neuberger%took%Lord%Mance’s%approach%
to% scrutiny,% even% in% relation% to% the%weighing%of% public% interests,% to%be% a% robust%one,% saying% that% it%
would%‘normally%be%very%hard%for%[the%executive]%to%justify%differing%from%a%tribunal%decision%on%the%
balancing%exercise%on%Lord%Mance’s%analysis’.20%In%contrast,%Lord%Wilson%said%that%the%question%for%the%
court% was% simply% ‘whether% the% grounds% which% formed% [the% Attorney6General’s]% opinion% were%
reasonable’,21%while% Lord% Hughes% merely% said% that% the% Attorney6General% was% required% to% act%
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20%[2015]%UKSC%21,%[2015]%2%WLR%813,%[93].%
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rationally.22%For%the%dissentients,%then,%an%unvarnished%test%of%Wednesbury'reasonableness%—%rather%
than%a%more%demanding%requirement%such%as%one%involving%‘anxious%scrutiny’23%or%‘cogent%reasons’24%
—% applied,% thereby% making% the% override% power,% at% least% when% exercised% on% the% basis% of% a%
disagreement%as%to%the%weighing%of%public%interests,%a%generous%one.%%
What%accounts%for%the%different%positions%occupied%by%Lord%Mance%and%by%the%dissentients?%Why%do%
they% appear% to% disagree% about% the%meaning% of% the% statutory% term% ‘reasonable% grounds’% and% (as% a%
result)% the% standard% of% judicial% scrutiny% that% should% apply%when% determining% the% adequacy% of% the%
proffered%grounds?%Scope% for%disagreement%arises%because,% self6evidently,% these%questions%are%not%
decisively%answered%by%the%text%of%the%statute.%Rather,%the%wording%of%the%text%allows%the%Justices%to%
project%onto%the%statute%their%own%visions%concerning%the%extent%to%which%(a)%the%legislature%should%
be%taken%to%have%authorized%executive%override%of%a%judicial%body;%(b)%the%executive%should%be%free%to%
determine%for%itself%when%it%is%reasonable%to%exercise%the%override%power;%and%(c)%a%reviewing%court%
should%exercise%vigilance%when%examining%the%reasons%offered%as%justification%for%the%exercise%of%the%
power.%%
In%approaching%these%issues,%the%dissentients%chose%to%examine%the%statutory%text%largely%in%isolation%
from%other% constitutional%principles% that%might%have% informed% the% statute’s% interpretation%and% the%
conception%of%the%judicial%role%under%it.%Lord%Wilson’s%judgment,%for%instance,%includes%an%account%of%
the%legislative%history%of%what%became%the%FoIA,%leading%him%to%the%view%that%the%override%power%‘is%a%
central%feature%of%the%Act’.25%Meanwhile,%Lord%Hughes%took%the%issue%before%the%court%to%be%‘a%matter%
of%the%plain%words%of%the%statute’;26%and%while%he%acknowledged%that%the%rule%of% law%‘is%of% the%first%
importance’,% he% emphasized% that% an% ‘integral% part’% of% that% principle% is% that% ‘courts% give% effect% to%
Parliamentary% intention’.27%On% this% analysis,% there% was% no% warrant% for% rendering% the% reasonable6
grounds%test%more%demanding%than%it%appeared%at%face%value.%%
In% contrast,% Lord%Mance’s% approach% to% the% statute% and% to% the% reviewing% court’s% role% under% it%was%
informed% to% a% greater% extent% by% rule6of6law% and% separation6of6powers% concerns% that% arguably%
warrant%particular%vigilance%in%relation%to%executive%action%that%stands%in%opposition%to%the%judgment%
of%an%independent%judicial%tribunal.%His%departure,%even%in%weighing6of6public6interests%cases,%from%a%
bare%rationality%standard%acknowledges%the%constitutional%dubiousness%of%the%override%power,%more6
intensive%review%of% its%exercise%connoting%not% that% the%reviewing%court%enjoys%particular% legitimacy%
(relative% to% the% executive)% in% respect% of% the% weighing% task,% but% that% the% decision% of% the% Upper%
Tribunal%to%which%the%weighing%exercise%was%originally%assigned%itself%warrants%a%degree%of%respect%by%
virtue%of%constitutional%principles%that%demand%executive%compliance%with%judgments%of%independent%
judicial%bodies.%On%this%approach,%reasonable%grounds%for%administrative%override%of%such%judgments%
form%a%necessarily%slim%category.%%
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A"top5down,"constitutional5law"approach"
The%ultimate%point%of%contestation%between%Lord%Mance%and%the%dissentients% is% thus%the%nature%of%
the% constitutional% environment% that% the%FoIA% inhabits,% and,% in%particular,% the%extent% to%which% that%
environment% is%sufficiently%normatively%rich%to% justify%departure%from%the%view%—%which% itself%rests%
on%(different)%normative%considerations%—%that%courts%should%only%give%effect%to%the%‘plain%words’%of%
legislation.% Precisely% the% same% point% of% contestation% explains% the% disagreement% between% Lord%
Neuberger%on%the%one%hand%and%Lords%Mance,%Hughes%and%Wilson%on%the%other.%This%disagreement,%
however,% plays% out% on% a% much% broader% constitutional% canvas,% being% concerned% not% with% the%
appropriate% depth% of% judicial% scrutiny% (which% is% itself,% admittedly,% an% ultimately% constitutional%
question)% but% with% the% deployment% of% normative% principles% so% as% to% interpretively% neutralise%
unconstitutional% executive% authority.% To% put% the% matter% in% blunter% terms,% whereas% Lord% Mance%
utilised%administrative6law%instruments%in%order%to%narrow%the%override%power,%Lord%Neuberger%used%
constitutional6law%tools%to%eviscerate%it.%This%distinction%reflects%the%differing%extents%to%which%Lords%
Neuberger% and%Mance%were% prepared% to% permit% fundamental% constitutional% principles% to% operate%
upon%the% interpretive%process.%While,%as%we%have%seen,%Lord%Mance%was%not%unsympathetic%to%the%
normative%claims%made%by% the%separation6of6powers%and% rule6of6law%principles,%he%opted% to% invest%
them%with%purchase%by%means%of%modulating% the%operative% standard%of% review.% The% statutory% text%
exerted%a%significant%pull,%but%one%that%was%interpretively%tempered%by%the%application%of%competing%
constitutional%principles%that%pointed%away%from%a%plain6words%construction.%(For%the%dissentients,%of%
course,%the%statute%exerted%a%stronger%pull%still,%Lord%Wilson%treating%parliamentary%sovereignty%as%a%
focal%constitutional%principle%that%is%‘emblematic%of%our%democracy’.28)%%
For%Lord%Neuberger,%in%contrast,%the%pull%of%the%statutory%text%(and%hence,%it%can%be%inferred,%of%the%
principle% of% parliamentary% sovereignty% that% favours% judicial% fidelity% to% such% texts)%was%weaker,% the%
force%exerted%by%the%separation%of%powers%and%the%rule%of%law%being%correspondingly%stronger%—%an%
approach%that%can%be%attributed%to%Lord%Neuberger’s%defensible%perception%that%a%broad%executive6
override%power%would%represent%not%merely%a%marginal%skirmish%with,%but%a%full6frontal%assault%upon,%
those%constitutional%principles.%Lord%Neuberger%therefore%placed%the%constitutional%objectionability,%
as%he% saw% it,% of% an%executive6override%power% front%and% centre.%A%power%enabling% the%executive% to%
override% a% judicial% decision%with%which% it% disagreed%would,% he% said,% be% ‘unique% in% the% laws% of% the%
United% Kingdom’% and%would% ‘cut% across% two% constitutional% principles% which% are% also% fundamental%
components%of% the% rule%of% law’29%—%namely,% that% judicial%decisions% ‘cannot%be% ignored%by%anyone’,%
‘least% of% all% …% the% executive’,% and% that% executive% action,% ‘subject% to% jealously% guarded% statutory%
exceptions’,%must% be% subject% to% judicial% scrutiny.30%Lord%Neuberger’s% view%was% that% broad%override%
powers%would%‘flout%…%the%first%principle’%and%‘stand%…%the%second%principle%on%its%head’.31%%
These%considerations%led%Lord%Neuberger%to%perform%upon%the%Act%what%can%only%be%described%—%not%
necessarily% pejoratively%—% as% radical% interpretive% surgery% pursuant% to% the% principle% of% legality.% In%
applying% that% principle,% he% invoked% a% series% of% cases% including% Pierson,32%Jackson33%and% AXA,34%
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concluding% that% s%53%of% the%FoIA%would%be% capable%of%having% the% ‘remarkable%effect’%urged%by% the%
Attorney6General%only% if% the% text%provided% for% such%an%effect% in% terms% that%were% ‘crystal% clear’.35%It%
followed%that%the%legislation%did%not%permit%a%member%of%the%executive%to%override%an%Upper%Tribunal%
decision%whenever%he%or%she%took%‘a%different%view’.36%However,%Lord%Neuberger%went%much%further%
than%merely% ruling% out% the% assignment% to% the% executive% of% carte' blanche'override% powers.% Rather%
than% holding% that% s% 53,% properly% construed,% did% not% permit% override% whenever% the% executive%
disagreed% with% the% Tribunal,% he% concluded% that% the% power% could% be% exercised% only% in% two% highly%
limited% and% unlikely% sets% of% circumstances% —% namely,% in% the% event% of% ‘a% material% change% of%
circumstances%since%the%tribunal%decision’%or%if%‘the%decision%of%the%tribunal%was%demonstrably%flawed%
in%fact%or%in%law’.37%This%led%Lord%Neuberger%to%conclude%that%it%is%‘not%reasonable’%for%the%Attorney6
General% to% invoke% s% 53% ‘simply% because,% on% the% same% facts%and'admittedly' reasonably,% he% takes% a%
different%view%from%that%adopted%by%a%court%of%record%after%a%full%public%oral%hearing’.38%To%the%extent%
that%the%obvious%‘paradox’,%as%Lord%Wilson%put%it,39%raised%by%Lord%Neuberger’s%position%is%capable%of%
resolution,%such%resolution%turns%upon%a%construction%of%s%53%that%holds%it%will%never%be%reasonable%to%
exercise%the%veto%outwith%the%two%exceptional%circumstances.%In%other%words,%an%Attorney6General’s%
opinion% based% upon% otherwise6reasonable% grounds% will% not% satisfy% the% legislation% because,% as%
construed% by% Lord% Neuberger,% the% existence% of% one% of% the% exceptional% circumstances% is% a%
precondition%for%the%existence%of%reasonable%grounds%in'the'statutory'sense.%'%
Neither% Lord%Mance%nor% the%dissentients%were%prepared% to% subscribe% to% this% construction%of% s% 53.%
Lord%Mance% considered% that% s% 53% ‘must% have% been% intended% by% Parliament% to% have,% and% can% and%
should%be%read%as%having,%a%wider%potential%effect’%than%that%which%Lord%Neuberger’s%interpretation%
afforded% it.40%Lord% Hughes% went% further:% Parliament% had% ‘plainly% shown’% its% intention,41%and% Lord%
Neuberger’s% construction% was% ‘simply% too% highly% strained’:42%it% rendered% ‘vestigial’% the% ‘generally%
expressed% power’% conferred% by% s% 53.43%Meanwhile,% Lord% Wilson’s% critique% was% nothing% short% of%
trenchant:% the% Court% of% Appeal,44%whose% view% concerning% the% need% for% exceptional% circumstances%
Lord%Neuberger%shared,%‘did%not%…%interpret’%s%53%—%it%‘re6wrote’%it.45%Indeed,%Lord%Wilson%went%so%far%
as%to%say%that%the%exceptional%circumstances%required%by%Lord%Neuberger% for%the%triggering%of%s%53%
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were%so%‘far6fetched’%as%to%mean%that%‘for%all%practical%purposes’%it%would%‘almost%never’%be%possible%
for%the%power%to%be%used%so%as%to%override%a%tribunal%ruling.46%
Lord%Wilson%has%a%point.%The%impact%upon%s%53%of%Lord%Neuberger’s%interpretation%is%drastic.%Indeed,%
it% is%comparable%to%the%radical% implications%that%the%House%of%Lords’% judgment% in%Anisminic'had%for%
the%ouster%provision%contained%in%s%4(4)%of%the%Foreign%Compensation%Act%1950.47%This%indicates%that,%
for% Lord% Neuberger,% the% pull% of% constitutional% principles% favouring% judicial% independence% and% the%
inviolability% of% judicial% decisions% is% very% strong% indeed.% To% some% extent,% this% can% be% regarded% as%
evidence%of%the%tension%that%exists%in%this%context%between%those%principles%and%(depending%upon%the%
uses%to%which%it%is%put)%parliamentary%sovereignty.%However,%the%matter%is%not%as%straightforward%as%
that,% for% it%also% reveals% that%Lord%Neuberger’s%understanding%of% those%other%principles% itself%differs%
from% the% understandings% of% Lords% Mance,% Hughes% and% Wilson.% For% instance,% the% four% judgments%
reflect%a%spectrum%of%judicial%opinion%concerning%the%separation%of%powers%and,%in%particular,%about%
the% relative% weight% to% be% ascribed% to% those% aspects% of% the% principle% that% respectively% favour% (a)%
judicial%deference%(by%a%reviewing%court)%to%executive%decision6making%and%(b)%executive%respect%for%
and% compliance% with% the% decisions% of% independent% judicial% bodies..% For% Lord% Mance,% the% latter%
consideration%impacted%upon%the%former,% judicial%scrutiny%of%the%quality%of%the%executive’s%decision%
being%heightened%by%the%fact%that,%in%the%first%place,%that%decision%chafed%against%that%aspect%of%the%
separation% of% powers% which% favours% the% inviolability% of% judicial% decisions.% In% contrast,% for% Lord%
Neuberger,% any% question% of% judicial% deference% to% executive% decision6making% under% s% 53% was%
foreclosed% by% means% of% the% priority% accorded% to% the% inviolability% consideration,% the% scope% of% the%
power%being%construed%in%such%narrow%terms%as%to%reduce%the%range%of%circumstances%in%which%the%
power%could%be%exercised%(and%the%executive’s%judgment%in%relation%to%its%exercise%given%any%degree%
of% weight% at% all)% almost% to% vanishing% point.% In% this% way,% Lords% Mance% and% Neuberger% assigned%
different%weights%to%distinct%aspects%of%the%separation%of%powers.%
That% said,% their% approaches% are% also% distinguished% by% the% extent% to%which% they%were% prepared% to%
permit% that% principle,% along%with% the% rule% of% law,% to% shape% the% interpretation% of% the% statute.% Lord%
Neuberger’s%construction%is%undeniably%strangulated,%the%interpretations%of%the%other%Justices%being%
obviously% far% less% strained.%Does% this%mean% that%Lord%Neuberger’s% construction% is%wrong,%or% that% it%
denies%parliamentary%sovereignty?%Viewed%in%one%way,%the%notion%of%parliamentary%sovereignty%is%a%
binary%one:%either%Parliament%is%sovereign,%because%it%is%competent%to%enact%any%legislation%it%wishes,%
or%it%is%not;%and,%if%it%is%sovereign,%courts%have%no%choice%but%to%enforce%its%enactments%regardless%of%
their% content.% That% obligation% lies% at% the% heart% of% the% notion% of% parliamentary% sovereignty,% any%
qualification% of% the% obligation% being% an% apparent% repudiation% of% the% sovereignty% principle% itself.%
However,% the%significance%of% the%obligation%can%meaningfully%be%understood%only% in% the% light%of% its%
content.%And%whatever%the%content%of%the%obligation%might%be,%it%self6evidently%does%not%connote%a%
duty% invariably% to% give% effect% to% nothing% other% than% the% literal% meaning% of% the% words% used% by%
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47%Anisminic'Ltd'v'Foreign'Compensation'Commission'[1969]%2%AC%147.%Although%Anisminic' is%sometimes%
presented% as% an% example% of% judicial% disobedience% to% statute,% not% least% because% it% is% perceived% to% have%
rendered%the%preclusive%clause%nugatory,%it%did%not%in%fact%—%at%the%time%Anisminic'was%decided%—%have%
such% an% effect% since% it% preserved% the% capacity% of% the% ouster% clause% to% preclude% judicial% intervention% in%
respect% of% non6jurisdictional% errors% on% the% face% of% the% record.% It% is% arguable% that% Lord% Neuberger’s%
construction% of% s% 53% of% the% FoIA% rendered% it% at% least% as,% and% perhaps% more,% ‘vestigial’% than% did% the%
Appellate%Committee’s%interpretation%of%the%ouster%in%Anisminic.%
Parliament.% The% judicial% obligation% to% enforce% legislation% implies% a% judicial% power% to% interpret% it,%
including%in%the%light%of%relevant%constitutional%principles.%%
This%is%not,%however,%to%suggest%that%the%principle%of%parliamentary%sovereignty%is%an%infinitely%elastic%
one,%such%that%no%amount%of%judicial%violence%to%statutory%provisions%would%imply%any%breach%of%the%
judicial% obligation% implicit% in% the% principle.% Unless% the% obligation% to% enforce% legislation% is% to% be%
emptied%of%any%meaningful%content,%a%point%must%come%at%which%the%statutory%text%is%so%clear%as%to%
preclude%a%given% ‘interpretation’,%even% if%competing%constructions%would%accommodate%rule6of6law%
or% separation6of6powers% considerations% less% fully.% The% obligation,% after% all,% is% to% interpret% the%
statutory%provision,%not%to%treat%it%as%an%essentially%blank%canvas%on%which%to%project%constitutional%
values% that% operate% so% radically% upon% the% provision% as% to% overwhelm% it.% Viewed% in% this% way,% it% is%
difficult%to%avoid%the%conclusion%that%Lord%Neuberger’s%treatment%of%s%53%of%the%FoIA%at%least%closely%
approached,%and%may%have%crossed,%the%fine%line%that%distinguishes%bold%statutory%construction%from%
judicial%intransigence%in%the%face%of%a%constitutionally%offensive%statutory%provision.%%
On% the% face% of% it,% the% crossing% of% that% Rubicon% (if% indeed% it% was% crossed)% is% itself% constitutionally%
offensive% to% the% principle% of% parliamentary% sovereignty,% since% it% implies% a% failure% to% discharge% the%
obligation%to%enforce%legislation%that%is%its%very%essence.%Yet%such%judicial%interventions%may%take%on%a%
different%complexion%if%viewed%in%wider%perspective.%A%decision%like%Evans'is%not%necessarily%the%end%
of% the% road% as% far% as% the% bigger% legal% picture% is% concerned.% It% would,% after% all,% be% possible% for%
Parliament% to% respond% by% amending% s% 53% in% order% to% render% the% override% power% exercisable% in%
circumstances% broader% than% those% contemplated% by% Lord% Neuberger.48%Any% such% revised% provision%
would% itself,% of% course,% be% subject% to% judicial% interpretation,% but,% inevitably,% the% more% clearly%
expressed% a% successor% provision,% the% more% resistant% it% would% be% to% interpretive% reshaping.% The%
approach% to% statutory% construction% disclosed% by% Lord%Neuberger’s% judgment% in%Evans' can% thus% be%
regarded% as% part% of% an% iterative% process:% a% constitutional% dance% in% which% the% courts% either% pull%
Parliament% back% from% a% perceived% constitutional% brink% by% interpretively% neutralising% the% relevant%
provision,%or%force%Parliament%to%confront%the%political%cost%of%retaliation%by%requiring%the%use%of%yet6
starker% terms% if% the% court’s% construction% is% to% be% successfully% displaced% through% legislative%
amendment.49%Viewed%thus,%Lord%Neuberger’s%treatment%of%s%53%may%fairly%be%characterised%as%a%soft%
form% of% judicial% strike6down:% an% interpretation% whose% boldness% casts% doubt% upon% the%
appropriateness%of%so%characterising%it,%but%one%that%is%legislatively%reversible%through%the%use%of%yet6
clearer%language.%%
Such%judicial%activism%does%not%sit%comfortably%with%the%notion%of%parliamentary%sovereignty,%but% it%
does% not% follow% that% the% two% are%wholly% irreconcilable.% Indeed,% such% a% judicial% approach%might% be%
considered%the%ultimate%illustration%of%the%relational%nature%of%the%three%fundamental%principles%that%
form%the%bedrock%of%the%UK’s%constitutional%order,%the%ascription%of%preponderant%weight%to%rule6of6
law% or% separation6of6powers% considerations% in% a% particular% case% being% rescued% from% constitutional%
heterodoxy% by% an% underlying% commitment% to% parliamentary% sovereignty% which% concedes% the%
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possibility%of% legislative%override.% In%this%way,%each%of%the%fundamental%principles% is% invested%with%a%
finite%degree%of%elasticity,%the%capacity%of%the%rule%of%law%and%the%separation%of%powers%to%qualify%the%
courts’% commitment% to% the% enforcement% of% legislation% being% itself% qualified% by% the% longstop%
possibility%of%Parliament’s% standing%upon% its% sovereign% right% to%have% the% last% (or% at% least% a% further)%
word.% The% untidiness% of% the% constitutional% order% implied% by% this% analysis% may% be% inherently%
unappealing.%But%such%untidiness%is%inevitable%in%a%system%in%which%the%rule%of%law,%the%separation%of%
powers%and%the%sovereignty%of%Parliament%each%rightly%assert%their%fundamentality,%but%in%which%(for%
the%time%being,%at%least)%ultimate%priority%is%conceded%to%the%latter%%
